




EUI Woiking Paper LAW No. 92/27
A National-Socialist Jurist 
on Crime and Punishment - 
Karl Larenz and the So-Called 
‘Deutsche Rechtserneuerung’
M assimo L a Torre




























































































3 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 3  6 3 7 7  1 ■r
Please note
As from January 1990 the EUI Working Paper Series is 
divided into six sub-series, each sub-series is numbered 


























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 92/27
A National-Socialist Jurist 
on Crime and Punishment - 
Karl Larenz and the So-Called 
‘Deutsche Rechtserneuerung’
Massimo  La Torre




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Massimo La Torre 
Printed in Italy in July 1992 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































A NATIONAL-SOCIALIST JURIST 
ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - 
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The treatment Karl Larenz gave the topic of penalty in the 
1930s is a pointer to the view of the relationships between 
individual and legal system and of the question of the 
individual's responsibility and legal capacity as theorized in 
National Socialist legal doctrine. For this German jurist, 
primarily a scholar of private law, dealing with the topic of 
penalty meant applying his conceptions1, and the principles of 
the Deutsche Rechtserneuerunq2 they are inspired by, to areas of
1 To be found chiefly, as far as questions of legal theory 
are concerned, in three works: K. Larenz, Deutsche 
Rechtserneuerunq und Rechtsphilosophie. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), Tübingen 1934; K. Larenz, Rechtsoerson und subiektives 
Recht. Zur Wandlunq der Rechtsqrundbeqriffe. in Grundfraaen der 
neuen Rechtswissenschaft. Junker und Dünnhaupt, Berlin 1935, 
p. 225 ss.; K. Larenz, Uber Geaenstand und Méthode des volkischen 
Rechtsdenkens. Junker und Dünnhaupt, Berlin 1938.
2 On the "Deutsche Rechtserneuerunq", that is, the movement 
of Nazi lawyers aiming at "German legal renewal" in the sense of 
adapting the legal system to the political directives of 
National-Socialism, see, for a general view, D. Grimm, Die "Neue 
Rechtswissenschaft" - Uber Funktion und Formation 
nationalsozialistischer Jurisorudenz. in D. Grimm, Recht und 
Staat der biirqerlichen Gesellschaft■ Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 
1987, p.373 ff. For the area of private law, see B. Ruthers, Die 
unbeqrenzte Auslequnq. Zum Wandel der Privatrechtsordnunq im 
Nationalsozialismus. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen 1968, 
and P. Thoss, Das subiektive Recht in der qliedschaftlichen 
Bindung. Zum Verhaltnis von Nationalsozialismus und Privatrecht. 
Europaische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main 1968. For public 
law, see Staatsrecht und Staatsrechtslehre im Dritten Reich, ed. 
by Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, Muller, Heidelberg 1985; and cf. 
W. Hempfer, Die nationalsozialistische Staatsauffassung in der 
Rechtsprechung des Preussischen Oberverwaltunqsqerichts. Duncker 
und Humblot, Berlin 1974; for international law, see D.V. Vagts, 
International Law in the Third Reich■ in "American Journal of 
International Law", vol.84, 1990, p.661 ff. For the "German legal 
renewal" in the area of criminal law, see M. Stolleis, 
Gemeinwohlformeln im nationalsozialistischen Recht. J. Schweizer, 
Berlin 1974. On criminalist legal scholarship variously preparing 
or supporting the Deutsche Rechtserneuerunq■ see K. Marxen, Der 
Kampf qeqen das liberate Strafrecht. Eine Studie zum 
Antiliberalismus in der Strafrechtswissenschaft der zwanziqer und 
dreiBiqer Jahre. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1975. Cf. also M. 
Frommel, Von der Strafrechtsreform zur "Rechtserneuerunq", in 
Recht. Rechtsphilosophie und Nationalsozialismus. ed. by H. 
Rottleuthner, Steiner, Wiesbaden 1983, p.445 ff. A scholarly, 




























































































law far from those most familiar to him, testing the "soundness" 
of his theories and verifying their validity in relation to the 
totality of legal phenomena.
The object of this study is principally to reconstruct and 
present the arguments of Larenz, an eminent and influential 
jurist of National-Socialism3, in the area of the theory of 
crime and punishment. In doing so, however, one cannot - nor 
would one wish to - avoid a glance at the events ranged obscurely 
behind the theory. In the conclusion I shall accordingly seek to 
outline some connections between Larenz's doctrine, Nazi legal 
theory and the totalitarian political model of which they are 
expressions.
1. "Community of the people", "concrete order", and legal 
subj ectivity
According to Larenz, the essence of the penalty is the 
meaning it has in itself, not as a means to an end external to 
it. In this connection he takes up a distinction earlier employed 
by another protagonist of the Deutsche Rechtserneueruna■ Walter 
Schonfeld: between "meaning" and "purpose"4. "Meaning is
summarizing and systematizing the results of the Deutsche 
Rechtserneueruna and of the debate around it among Nazi jurists 
can be found in H. Welzel, Per Allaemeine Teil des deutschen 
Strafrechts in seinen Grundzüaen. de Gruyter, Berlin 1940. On the 
legal philosophers who "flanked" the enterprise of Deutsche 
Rechtserneueruna■ see A. Kaufmann, Rechtsohilosophie und 
Nationalsozialismus. in Recht, Rechtsohilosophie und 
Nationalsozialismus. ed. by H. Rottleuthner, p.l ff.
3 Larenz is one of the representatives of the so-called 
"Kiel school", that is, of a number of teachers grouped in the 
legal faculty of the University of Kiel who were the most 
radical, combative wing of Nazi lawyers in the "Deutsche 
Rechtserneueruna"■ On the "Kiel school", also known, in its 
criminalist branch, as the "phenomenological school", cf. P. 
Thoss, Das subiektive Recht in der qliedschaftlichen Binduna■ 
p.39 ff.
4 Cf. W. Schonfeld, Rechtsohilosophie, Jurisprudenz und 
Rechtswisssenschaft. in "Zeitschrift für Deutsche 




























































































original definition; purpose, definition subsequently added. 
Meaning is based on itself, purpose on an arbitrary position. 
Meaning is "in" a thing, purpose attributed to it; meaning 
irradiates from the whole to the parts, from the personality to 
its action, from the community to the life of the individual, as 
it develops; purpose brings the thing into relation with another 
thing, subjects it"5.
For Larenz meaning is what brings a thing into immediate 
contact with another, a contact not mediated by any third 
external element. Purpose instead decrees the end of that 
immediacy and sets up between things artificial relationships 
which are no longer organic or intrinsic to the things 
themselves. "Meaning brings a thing into comprehensive, 
ultimately metaphysical, connection; purpose isolates it, divests 
it of its natural connections in order to bring it under a new 
linkage which however is non-oraanic. but mediated"6.
authors most cited by Larenz, from his very first articles: cf. 
K. Larenz, Die Wirklichkeit des Rechts. in "Logos", vol.16, 1927, 
p.209; and K. Larenz, Das Problem der Rechtsaeltuna. Junker and 
Dunnhaupt, Berlin 1929, pp.22, 30, 32, 36. To form an idea of 
Schonfeld's theory, it is sufficient to read W. Schonfeld, 
Deutsche Rechtsanschauung. in "Archiv fur Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie", vol.27, 1933/1934, p.463 ff.
5 K. Larenz, Vom Wesen der Strafe. in "Zeitschrift fur 
Deutsche Kulturphilosophie", vol.2, 1936, (henceforth cited as 
VWDS), p.26. The distinction between "meaning" and "purpose" is 
reformulated with somewhat new contents in Larenz's later 
doctrine: see K. Larenz, Die Sinnfraqe in der Rechtswissenschaft. 
in Festschrift fur Franz Wieacker zum 70. Geburtstaa. ed. by 0. 
Behrends, M. Die/3elhorst, H. Lange, D. Liebs, J.G. Wolf, C. 
Wollschlager, Vandenhoeck & Kuprecht, Gottingen 1978, p.411 ff.
6 VWDS, p .26, my emphasis. Criticism of conceptions of law 
based on the idea of purpose and in general on instrumental 
rationality (means/end) is a perennial theme in Nazi legal 
doctrine: cf., e.g., E. Forsthoff, Vom Zweck im Recht. in 
"Zeitschrift der Akademie fur Deutsche Recht", vol.4, 1937, p.174 
ff. The uselessness of the concepts of "purpose" and "interest" 
for a legal doctrine guided by the principles of National- 
Socialism is also affirmed by W. Siebert, Vom Wesen des 
RechtsmiBbrauchs. Uber die konkrete Gestaltuna der Rechte. in 





























































































The mode of thought centred round the concept of purpose, 
defined by Larenz, in Hegel's footsteps, as Verstandesdenken and 
undoubtedly identified with the Aufklaruna. inevitably, in his 
view, leads to "positivism". Here Larenz, as often happened in 
his case, overlaps the two notions of philosophical positivism 
and legal positivism7 8, in part because of unclear understanding 
of the two distinct cultural phenomena6, in part, too, because 
he considers that legal positivism and philosophical positivism 
are closely connected with each other9. Positivism (legal and 
philosophical together) "knows nothing of any meaning of the law 
but only of purposes pursued by the individual legal norms. The 
legal norm becomes a provision, a means, by the help of which the 
legislator accomplishes his arbitrarily set purposes"10. Thus - 
Larenz goes on - law ceases to be a people's will for justice and 
ethical spirit, becoming degraded into a "subtly meditated means 
of rule over society"11.
7 Cf., e.g., K. Larenz, Die Wirklichkeit des Rechts. cit., 
p.204. It is significant in this connection that Larenz uses the 
expressions "positive legal statutes" and "empirical laws" 
indifferently to denote the norms of a positive (State) legal 
system (cf. K. Larenz, Das Problem der Rechtsaeltuna. in 
particular pp.18-19, note 47).
8 For a clear distinction between philosophical positivism 
and legal positivism, see G. Fassò, Storia della filosofia del 
diritto. voi.3, Il Mulino, Bologna 1970, p.217 ff.
9 Cf. K. Larenz, Deutsche Rechtserneuerung und 
Rechtsphilosophie. p.ll, where he asserts that legal positivism 
takes its roots from philosophical positivism.
10 VWDS, p . 27.
11 Ibid. Law as a subtly considered "means" for ruling 
society is indeed exactly what the Nazi regime achieved. In Nazi 
Germany - writes Franz Neumann - the law is a technical 
instrument for the accomplishment of specific political goals. 
"Law is merely an arcanum dominationis. a means for the 
stabilization of power" (F. Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and 
Practice of National Socialism (1933-19441. Frank Cass, London 
1967, p.448). In this connection, see also H. Schorn, Die 




























































































The distinction between "meaning" <Sinnl and "purpose" 
(Zweck) serves Larenz as a starting point for dealing with the 
issues of penalty. Thanks to this preliminary distinction, the
Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1963. Cf. also I. Muller, 
Furchtbare Juristen. Die unbewaltiate Vergagenheit unserer 
Justiz. Knaur, Miinchen 1989, and B. Ruthers, Entartetes Recht. 
Rechtslehren und Kroniuristen im Dritten Reich. Beck, Miinchen 
1988. For an overall view of Nazi legal systems, see D. Majer,
Grundlagen____ des____ nationalsozialistischen____ Rechtssvstems.
Fiihrerprinzib. Sonderrecht. Elnheitspartei. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 
1987.
As to the legal nature of the Nazi State, opinions differ. 
There are those who deny the Nazi State the character of legality 
and with it also that of statehood, regarded as bound up 
therewith: this is the opinion of Franz Neumann (cf. F. Neumann, 
Behemoth. in particular p.467 ff.). Some instead speak of a "dual 
State", maintaining that alongside or inside the traditional 
State structure, Nazi Germany presents an organization of a 
different type coinciding with that of the Party (the NSDAP) or 
of some special bodies (primarily the SS). The latter opinion is 
maintained by Ernst Fraenkel (cf. E. Fraenkel, The Dual State. 
A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship. English trans. by 
E.A. Shils, Octagon Books, New York 1969). On this controversy 
cf. W. Luthardt, Unrechtsstaat Oder Doppelstaat. Kritisch-
theoretische Reflektionen liber die____Struktur des
Nationalsozialismus aus der Sicht demokratischer Sozialisten. in 
Recht. Rechtsphilosophie und Nationalsozialismus. ed. by H. 
Rottleuthner, p.197 ff. On the special nature of the legal
organization of the "Third Reich", cf. also H. Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York 
1979, p .418, where she speaks of the Nazi State's
"structurelessness". Interesting considerations on this point are 
to be found in J.P. Stern, Hitler. Der Führer und das Volk, dtv, 
München 1981, p.107 ff. Stern maintains the following: "A
controlled chaos of institutions: this is perhaps the best wav 
of describing the characteristic form of National-Socialist rule" 
(ibid., p.lll, emphasis in original).
Nazi law, under the ideological veil of "communitarian 
popular law" woven by theoreticians like Larenz, got rid of laws 
understood as general and to some extent rational provisions (as 
being linked among themselves by provisions of a formal logical 
nature) (cf. F. Neumann, Behemoth. p.440 ff.) and made the law 
only a disconnected set of "measures" (MaBnahmen). that is, of 
commands. Were it not that behind these commands there was still 
an accepted normative system (albeit in a restricted sphere, 
within the National-Socialist party, the NSDAP), the Fuhrerstaat 
could have been the delight of imperativist theoreticians of law, 
fully confirming their conception of the legal phenomenon. The 
problems of a hypothetical model of society governed solely by 
commands are well set out by Axel Hagerstrom. On this see E. 





























































































Nazi jurist is able immediately to clear the field of 
utilitarian, or as he puts it "positive", theories of penalty. 
"Positivist, rational thinking in terms of purpose enables one 
to ask only about the purpose of the penalty, not about its 
meaning. The penalty is thus conceived from the outset 
exclusively as a means, and the punishment as a measure. intended 
to pursue a particular purpose"12. Civil society intimidation 
and the so-called rehabilitation of the delinquent have the 
purpose of protecting society, seen as the totality of citizens. 
In that perspective there is no room for an "absolute 
justification" of the penalty. One might certainly - adds Larenz 
- replace the purposes of bourgeois society by those of the 
"national community" and assert that by the "elimination” or 
"neutralization" of the delinquent, recognized as incapable of 
community life, or by re-educating him or her to become a member 
of the community, the purpose of safeguarding the people is being 
pursued. However, one would according to him even so remain a 
prisoner of the utilitarian Weltanschauung of liberal, positivist 
thought, failing to recognize the profound meaning that penalty 
takes on in the community order13.
To explain what in his view is the "meaning" of penalty, 
Larenz first clarifies what he regards as the meaning and scope
12 VWDS, p.28; emphasis in original. The attack on "purpose" 
as the pivotal concept of the theory of penalty contains an 
implicit polemical reference to Franz von Liszt, who had made 
"purpose" the Leitmotiv of his own criminalist doctrine (cf. F. 
von Liszt, Per Zweckaedanke im Strafrecht. in F. von Liszt, 
Strafrechtliche Aufsàtze und Vortràge. vol.1, J. Guttentag, 
Berlin 1905, p.126 ff.), and to the influential school of 
criminal law that had taken off from von Liszt's ideas (the work 
of such as Gustav Radbruch) . For an explicit critique of von 
Liszt's school by National-Socialist criminalist doctrine, cf. 
F. Schaffstein, Rechtswidriakeit und Schuld im Aufbau des neuen 
Strafrechtssvstems. in G. Dahm, F. Schaffstein, Methode und 
System des neuen Strafrechts. de Gruyter, Berlin n.d. (but 1937), 
pp.295 ff.
13 On the problems inherent in justifying penalty from a 
utilitarian viewpoint, see P. Roller, Problème der 
utilitaristischen Strafrechtfertigung■ in "Zeitschrift für die 




























































































of the concept of law, then goes on to establish the concept of 
the wrongful or illicit (Unrecht), and from this finally derives 
the concept of penalty. For him law is the specific order of the 
community, "the form the national community gives itself"14. Law 
is the form of life of the community. Thence derives its 
bindingness, for "where the community disintegrates, law loses 
its binding force and becomes transformed into a mere 
conventional rule or coercive external norm devoid of all ethical 
content and still justified at all only by external 
expediency"15. Law accordingly has its roots in the being of 
that social organism that marks the "higher" phase of the history 
of man16 and represents the maturity and maximum vitality of 
man's life in society, namely the Volksqemeinschaft. "The 
community is at once the origin and the end of law. It is origin 
not in the sense of being prior in time but in the sense that the 
whole comes 'before' the parts”17. Moreover, as Larenz adds, 
just as law takes its origin from the community, so it leads back 
to it, seeking to conform the people's life in accordance with
14 VWDS, p.31. Cf. K. Larenz, Über Geoenstand und Methode
des volkischen Rechtsdenkens. p.10 ff. In formulating the theory 
of the legal system as "concrete order", Larenz also draws on the 
organicist institutionalism upheld by Carl Schmitt (see C. 
Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen 
Denkens■ Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg 1934, p.ll ff.). 
For an explicit affirmation of the affinity between Schmitt's 
doctrine and that developed by Larenz, see K. Larenz, review of 
C. Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen 
Denkens■ in "Zeitschrift für Deutsche Kulturphilosophie", vol.l, 
1935, p .112 ff. Cf. L. Lüderssen, Dialektik. Topik und "konkretes 
Ordnunasdenken" in der Jurisprudenz. in K. Lüderssen,
Kriminalpolitik auf verschlungenen Weqen. Aufsàtze zur
Vermittlung von Theorie und Praxis. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 
1981, p .115 ff. On Schmitt's institutionalism and its ideological 
nature, see F. Neumann, Behemoth. p.448 ff.
15 VWDS, p.32.
16 See K. Larenz, Tvpoloqisches Rechtsdenken. Bemerkunqen zu 
V. Tuka: Die Rechtssvsteme. in "Archiv für Rechts- und





























































































the image of the "genuine justice" which that people produces of 
itself as an expression of its nature. Community and law are 
accordingly intrinsically interlinked, as form and content: one 
cannot do without the other, and vice versa. It is from the 
"community" that the law has its "meaning" and its binding force.
The "national community" is not the mere being together of 
people in a given geographical area. That our German jurist 
conceives the community social organism, the Volksqemeinschaft■ 
as a body never reducible to the set of individuals who do 
nonetheless make it up, emerges a contrario even from the 
foregoing assertion. "Intimidation, neutralization, but also the 
rehabilitation of the criminal to make him a 'useful member of 
society' again and thereby save him from recidivism have in the 
last analysis the object of protecting society, as the sum of all 
citizens, against crime"18. Larenz is, however, also explicit in 
this connection. "The community [...]" he writes "is not a sum 
of individuals nor even only their mere living together in the 
same area"19.
The "community" is based on a people's unity of blood and 
destiny. Nonetheless, in order for the life of the "community" 
to be able to develop from that unity there must be not only the 
intrinsic unity of social life (combining blood, destiny and 
history), but also the initiative of the individual, his action 
and responsibility vis-à-vis his comrades, and hence awareness 
of their mutual belonging. The "community", maintains Larenz, 
consists not only of the subordination of the individual's 
interests to the collectivity's (which he nevertheless 
uneguivocally affirms)20. "The community must not be thought of 
solely as a body abstractly counterposed to its members, to which
18 VWDS, p.28.
19 VWDS, p.32.
20 Larenz unequivocably upholds "the primacy of the 
community's life over the individual's interest" (VWDS, p.40), 
in accordance with the National-Socialist principle asserting 




























































































these must merely be subordinate. The individual, despite the 
community's superiority, nevertheless takes part in the community 
rather than facing it as an object, instead being in it as 
subject, that is as joint bearer (Mittraaer) of the community 
life"2'.
Our German jurist gets caught in the contradiction between 
the primacy of the community and the need for activation of and 
participation by the individual and hence of at least a minimum 
of autonomous activity, which is explicitly recognized where the 
outlines of the so-called Rechtsste1lung are sketched out21 2. The 
latter, conceived of as an objectively determined position, 
counterposed to subjective right23, is nonetheless a subjective 
legal situation distinct_ from merely being an addressee or 
"reflex" of objective law and refers to an aspect (albeit reduced 
in the extreme) of freedom of the subject. Larenz on the one hand 
asserts the total superiority of the "community" over the 
individual but then affirms that he is an essential element of 
it, a subject and not object of law, whose initiative, alongside 
the - objective requisites of unity and history, is among the 
necessary conditions for the formation of the community organism. 
Larenz sees the "false antithesis between individual and 
community" as "overcome" in a "genuine community"24. In my view, 
however, this "antithesis" persists, since the individual is 
conceived not only as an apparatus of the "community" devoid of 
own initiative and good only for transmitting and executing its 
orders and impulses, but also as in some sense an active subject 
(in however narrow limits), and the "community" is at any rate 
not a product of this subject but of "laws", "destinies",
21 VWDS, p. 33 .
22 Cf. K. Larenz, Vertrag und Unrecht. 1 Teil: Vertrag und 
Vertragsbruch. Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg 1936, p.36.
23 Cf. K. Larenz, Rechtsoerson und subiektives Recht. Zur 
Wandlung der Rechtsgrundbegriffe. p.260.




























































































"spirits" that escape determination by him and operate in a 
dimension well beyond his radius of action.
Note that the "freedom" that Larenz recognizes to the 
individual is a minimal freedom whose existence would not in any 
way serve to define a political system. This "freedom" could 
certainly not serve as a basis for anyone wishing to assert the 
liberal nature of the Nazi regime. The minimal freedom under 
discussion here is what results from the fact that every human 
being acts through his own nervous system and is the sole source 
of significant movement in space and time. No human enterprise, 
group or institution can ever do without this source. All this 
is trivial and obvious. This sort of freedom can accordingly, as 
being connected with man's very being, never define any social 
or political group or any legal order. Nevertheless, its 
existence raises enormous problems for those who conceive of 
human groups as absolutely distinct from the individual and wish 
to attribute to the latter an ontological status inferior to 
society's. That would make society, not the individual, 
constitute the main if not sole source of significant movement. 
These problems become acute in such a mind-boggled (and mind- 
boggling) conception of the relationship between society and the 
individual as National-Socialism's, giving rise to innumerable 
paradoxes and fallacies.
The freedom Larenz recognizes in and requires of the 
individual moreover refers to another range of problems than that 
of the ontological status of the individual and of society. 
National Socialism, while it repressed individuality and 
presented itself as a radically collectivist movement, needed, 
for the type of society and State it was seeking to create, the 
Volksgemeinschaft and the total State25, the active 
participation of individuals. The total State hailed by Nazism 
meant the erection into a political system of the total





























































































mobilization26 already experienced in military, and in part 
economic, terms during the First World War. Total mobilization 
requires the participation of the masses and of the individual. 
National Socialist legal and political doctrine advocated the 
absolute passivity (expressed in the term Gefolaschaft. 
designating the retinue over which Fuhrung is exercised and at 
the same time its allegiance to) and at the same time the 
participation of the individual.
2. Imputation as destiny
If law is the order of the "community", the unlawful will 
be violation of that order, antisocial or - in the terminology 
used by Larenz - "anticommunitarian" behaviour, that is, 
Gemeinschaftswidrigkeit27. The antisocial nature of the act does 
not however - according to our German jurist - imply that it need 
necessarily actually endanger the community's existence. An 
"anticommunitarian" act is instead one committed in breach of the 
duties resulting from the subject's two fundamental "legal 
positions" fRechtsstellunqenl: (a) the Rechtsstellunq as
"position of being member" of the community, as Gliedstellung. 
or the subject's relation with the community as a whole, and (b) 
the "legal position" deriving from particular legal (in general 
contractual) relations the subject carries on with other members 
of the community28. "Those who contravene the duties resulting 
from their own incorporation fEinqliederunq  ̂ into the community 
and their consequent bond with its other members act against the
26 Cf. E. Jünger, Die totale Mobilmachunq. in Krieq und 
Krieqer. ed. by E. Jünger, Junker und Dünnhaupt, Berlin 1930, p.9 
ff.
27 VWDS, p.34.
28 Cf. K. Larenz, Rechtsperson und subiektives Recht. Zur 




























































































community laemeinschaftswidrial1,29. Accordingly, even someone 
offending a single member of the community is acting against the 
community as a whole. Antisocial or "anti-communitarian" 
behaviour is not only, maintains our German jurist, engaged in 
by those committing the crime of high treason, but also by the 
thief, the cheat, the murderer. Whoever attacks the individual 
attacks the community and vice versa, "since the community and 
its members are one thing only"29 30. However, for Larenz the most 
typical of crimes remains treason, "the special feature of which 
is to be found in the criminal's radical denial of belonging to 
the community"31. This is the gravest, most repugnant crime in 
the Nazi jurist's conception: treason is "the most serious form, 
in some absolute fashion"32 of crime. Not murder (the most 
serious crime against the person) but treason (the most serious 
crime against the "community" or against the people) is, in 
National Socialist legal theory, the crime par excellence.
As I have mentioned above, Larenz does not rule out the 
psychological responsibility of the culprit, and constructs the 
imputability of this act to his deliberate intent. We might say 
that in this respect Larenz is closer to the "classical" 
conception of crime than to that of the "positive school". Our 
German jurist holds that crime is the outcome of the culprit's 
free choice, that responsibility for an act is inconceivable 
unless the act has been consciously willed. "Only the possibility 
of its negation renders possible also the free confirmation,
29 VWDS , pp. 33-34.
30 VWDS, p .34. "Crime," writes another Nazi jurist, "is 
understood as breach of specific duties deriving from the 
community. Accordingly, certain groups of offences have been 
given particular emphasis (the crimes of treason and breach of 
trust)" (W. Siebert, Vom Wesen des Rechtsmiflbrauchs. p.208, note 
46) .





























































































fulfilment, of one's own destiny fBestimmunq) as task and 
performance (Leistung). The responsibility of the individual is 
rooted in the fact that he may confirm or deny, fulfil or miss, 
his own destiny. The negation of his own ethical destiny, the 
negation of the community not only in this or that respect but 
of the community sic et simpliciter fschlechthin  ̂ and thereby of 
his own being as comrade (Genosse), is an extreme possibility of 
human action which, though it amounts to the denial of any 
responsibility, loads the culprit with the gravest 
responsibility, with an absolute responsibility"33. The 
individual, though subject to his destiny, may nonetheless decide 
either to carry it to fulfilment or to evade it by a free, 
conscious act. Crime is accordingly, according to Larenz, a 
product of a decision of the subject about his fate, and 
therefore an act of will. In consequence, our jurist recognizes 
that one cannot hold responsible a person who is totally 
irresponsible, that is, utterly incapable of intention and 
will34. Accordingly, no penalty can be inflicted on such an 
incapable person.
Determinism, or better fatalism, is in the background here, 
playing a subordinate role, contained as it is within the idea 
of the Bestimmunq of the acting subject which he may confirm or 
deny through his own autonomous decision. That is, at any rate, 
until the concept - of positivist, Lombrosian extraction - of the 
criminal "type" is introduced35. Larenz is, however, determinist
33 VWDS, p. 39 .
34 Cf. VWDS, p .40. This position is the "official" one of 
Nazi legal doctrine: cf. Nationalsozialistische Leitsàtze für ein 
neues deutsches Strafrecht. 1. Teil, ed. by H. Frank, 4th ed., 
Deutscher Rechtsverlag, Berlin 1935, p.35.
35 On the concept of "type" in National-Socialist doctrine, 
see K. Larenz, Typoloqisches Rechtsdenken■ Bemerkunqen zu V. 
Tuka: Die Rechtssvsteme. p.20 ff., and K. Larenz, Uber Gegenstand 
und Méthode des volkischen offentlichen Rechtsdenkens. p.45 ff. 
It is also on the notion of "type" that Larenz's later doctrine 
is constructed: cf. K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der 





























































































as far as the triggering of the mechanism of penalty is 
concerned. Though moderately voluntarist in the theory of crime, 
he is instead rigidly determinist as far as the theory of penalty 
is concerned. The penalty, according to him, results 
automatically from the anti-social nature of the act, which per 
se destroys the bond between subject and community. It is just 
the destruction of this bond that in Larenz's conception is the 
essence of the penalty. The penalty, from the fine to the death 
penalty, does not for him do anything other than render visible 
to all an event that has already occurred internally, 
underground: the failing of the relationship between an 
individual and community. "The penalty makes visible what the 
crime, as an act of will by a subject responsible to the 
community, is. according to its nature"36.
Larenz stresses the cogent need for the relationship which 
in his view is set up primarily between action and its legal 
treatment as a wrongful act and hence between the fact regarded 
as wrongful and the penalty. The legal description of a fact is 
not the outcome of the subsumption of a given event under 
elements of an offence specified by a norm attributing a certain 
value to it and accordingly a result of a decision of man (of 
judge and legislator). The legal description, according to 
Larenz, is instead intrinsic in the act itself and thus results 
not from a decision, an act that is to some extent always 
arbitrary, but from an ascertainment. comparable to the act 
whereby one establishes that a natural law applies. Wrongfulness, 
in this view, belongs to the world of "being", not to the 
normative world of "ought"; its determination will accordingly 
be contained in a descriptive rather than a prescriptive 
statement. "The assertion that crime is anti-communitarian 
behaviour ought not to be understood in a merely "normative" 
sense. A crime does not become an anti-community act merely 
because it is first brought into comparison with the requirements




























































































of community living and then judged to be against the community. 
Its anti-community nature is instead the meaning intrinsic in it 
from the outset, which is not attributed to it by the judge but 
ascertained by him"37.
Larenz disputes the conception of neo-Kantian philosophy 
that action as such belongs to the sphere of natural reality and 
is hence in itself devoid of ethical significance, acquiring this 
significance only following the intervention of the judge (in the 
trial) or the dogmatic jurist (in the construction of legal 
concepts). Larenz finally disputes the difference between 
causality and imputation, referring among others to the work of 
Georg Dahm and Friedrich Schaff stein, both of them Deutsche 
Rechtserneurunajurists committed to the redefinition of criminal 
law in a "folk" (yolkisch)38 and "community" sense, and members 
of the "Kiel school".
For Larenz wrongfulness, the legal description of an act as 
wrongful, is not the product of man. An act is not wrongful in 
relation to a certain norm, a certain normative system; an act 
is wrongful in itself, objectively, or better naturally. "An 
anti-community nature is the specific internal determinacy of 
crime, belonging to it over and above the fact whether it 
corresponds to the elements of an offence in a legal norm or 
not"39. Here, it may be noted, Larenz's ethical cognitivism, for 
which values are facts capable of objective determination, is 
translated fairly consistently to the legal plane. Acts have in 
themselves their ethical value which is therefore not a product 
of man but known in the same way as the physical laws that govern 
the occurrence of those acts. Larenz's ethical naturalism goes 
as far as considering not only the ethical description but even
57 VWDS, p. 34 .
38 Cf. J. Gernhuber, Das volkische Recht. Ein Beitraa zur 
Rechtstheorie des Nationalsozialismus. in Tubinqer Festschrift
fur Eduard Kern■ J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebek), Tubingen 1968, p.167 
ff.




























































































the legal one as an objective description and intrinsic value of 
the natural event. Accordingly, our German jurist is able to 
maintain that the ethical meaning of punishment is the intimately 
necessary consequence of the crime40. Moreover, it should be 
recalled that Larenz tends to overlap the two planes of ethics 
and law, drawing law into the orbit of the ethical world.
A rapid comparison with Kelsen's theory of the norm may 
serve to throw further light on Larenz's specific position. As 
we know, according to Kelsen, while the principle whereby one may 
understand the natural order is that of causality, the principle 
that lets us understand the legal order is that of imputation. 
Imputation, according to Kelsen, is distinguished from causality 
for three main reasons41, (a) While the law expressing the 
relation of causality is not regarded by Kelsen as posited 
arbitrarily (in the sense that one cannot equally well assume 
that water boils at 100 or at 25 degrees), the law expressing the 
relationship of imputation is absolutely arbitrary (in the sense 
that one may equally well assume, say, that a killer should be 
condemned to death, to 10 years imprisonment, or fined, or even 
rewarded with a decoration), (b) While the causal relation is 
infinite, in the sense that the cause of a certain effect x is 
in turn the effect of another cause and that the effect x is in 
turn the cause of another effect and so on ad infinitum, in the 
relation of imputation condition is not conditioned, and the 
conditioned event is not in turn a condition in the context of 
another relation of imputation, (c) While in the relationship of 
causality one assumes that cause and effect are linked by a bond, 
over and above the rule expressing that link, in the relation of 
imputation there is, over and above the norm expressing the 
relationship of imputation, no link between the two events (a 
certain piece of conduct and the penalty applied to it) . But 
according to Larenz the relationship between wrongful conduct and
40 Cf. VWDS , p . 30 .
41 On all this, see E. Pattaro, Lineamenti per una teoria 




























































































penalty, between conditioning event and conditioned event, is 
instead, as happens in the causal relationship, intrinsic and 
objective, that is, non-arbitrary. The penalty is not an effect 
attributed to the wrongfulness, but its natural consequence. The 
penalty is not an external consequence of the crime, but renders 
its inner essence explicit. It is perhaps more exact to say that 
in Larenz's doctrine it is not so much the penalty as the legal 
description as wrongful or as a crime that is the cogent effect 
of causal relationships set up between the "anti-community" 
behaviour (the cause) and its wrongfulness (effect). The penalty 
does nothing but make manifest or "reveal" the wrongfulness of 
the "anti-community" conduct.
"The essence of the act," writes Larenz in connection with 
crime, "is the perturbation or disruption of the community in 
which the culprit took part as a member (d i e d ) and comrade 
(Genosse). He learns in the penalty what that meant for him. The 
penalty separates him from the community, or rather makes 
manifest to him the separation from the community brought about 
through his act. Accordingly it is the actual accomplishment of 
what is posited in the act as its intrinsic meaning. It 
accordingly makes the culprit's responsibility effective, showing 
him that his existence is bound up with the community and that 
he has, in the community, attacked the deepest root of his very 
own being. The violation of community turns against its culprit; 
in the penalty he learns his separation from the community as a 
limitation on his own existence"42. We can better understand 
Larenz's conclusion when he writes that "the penalty is the 
necessary consequence of anti-community conduct, for which the 
culprit has to answer"43. In the penalty, "the consequences of 
the action recoil on its perpetrator"44: it represents for the
42 VWDS, pp.35-36. Emphasis in original. Cf. also VWDS,
p . 50.
43 VWDS, p . 35 .




























































































culprit "a fate (Schicksal1 that he has prepared for himself"45.
But if an act is wrongful not in relation to a norm but 
objectively, by its very nature, the judge, in order to ascertain 
the wrongfulness or unlawfulness of a piece of conduct, cannot 
(nor should) refer to the norm as his principal criterion of 
judgment. "The norm says only what the action is according to its 
nature, indicating to the judge the conclusions he should draw. 
It is not the norm under which the action falls that makes it a 
crime, but the meaning of the action as an actual, real violation 
of community that justifies the application of the norm"46. 
Accordingly the judge, in deciding the wrongfulness of a piece 
of conduct, should refer not to the written norm, which has an 
entirely relative importance and performs a secondary function 
in this view, but to the "inner" meaning of the conduct in 
question, in particular to the relationship it has with the 
"requirements" of the Volksqemeinschaft. This marks an end to the 
principal of strict legality, nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
lege, and the advent of an enormous power for the judge, to 
decide what is an offence and what not on the basis purely of 
considerations of political opportunity47.
45 VWDS, p . 35 .
46 Ibid.
47 The decisionism of the Nazi judge is further strengthened 
by the abrogation of the ban on analogical interpretation in 
criminal matters (see the Gesetz zur Anderuna des 
Strafgesetzbuches of 28 June 1935, art.l). However, this enhanced 
power for the judiciary organ does not justify the conclusion 
that the judge in the National-Socialist regime was absolutely 
sovereign in respect of the interpretation and application of the 
norm. Quite the contrary. The judge's power is absolute in 
relation to the parties, in relation to the accused and to the 
defence, which are no longer capable of verifying the formal 
procedure of the decision and the correctness of the 
argumentation whereby the judicial measure is arrived at. It is 
not so, however, in relation to the political authorities, which 
may in thousands of ways manipulate, direct and if need be undo 
the judge's measure (see H. Rottleuthner, Substantieller 
Dezisionismus. Zur Funktion der Rechtsohilosophie im 
Nationalsozialismus. in Recht. Rechtsohilosophie und 




























































































3. The penalty as stigma and as annihilation of the personality
"Whoever offends the community, be it the collectivity or 
another member of the community, thereby destroys his position 
in the community and loses his legal position (Rechtsstellung). 
Therein lies the essence both of the wrongfulness (Unrecht) and 
of the penalty"48. The wrongfulness has the automatic effect of
untying of the judge from the law and his duty to refer to the 
aesundes Volksempfinden enable the political power - which 
substantively controls judges' conduct - to move the machinery 
of justice as it pleases, in the most unconstrained fashion (cf. 
O. Kirchheimer, Criminal law in National Socialist Germany, in 
"Studies in Philosophy and Social Science", vol.8, 1939/40, p.444 
ff., now translated into German (by M. Looser) in 0. Kirchheimer, 
Von der Weimarer Republic zum Faschismus: die Auflôsuna der 
demokratischen Rechtsordnunq. ed. by W. Luthardt, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main 1981, p.186 ff.). As far as the activity of the 
Nazi judge is concerned it would, then, be correct to say that 
it is not so much increased decisional freedom as a freeing of 
his powers from formal references, and a materialization of 
jurisdictional practice. In the National-Socialist regime the 
judge's effective power was a paltry thing. Behind the freedom 
(from the law) of the judge's decision, proclaimed and 
ideologically constructed by regime doctrine, was concealed the 
iron fist of the party bosses and the Führer. As Professor 
Hinrich Rüping has written, "Das neue Rechtsdenken wird in einem 
System des Dezisionismus verwirklicht. DaB vôlkisches 
Rechtsdenken den Richter von formallogischen Fesseln der 
Subsumption befreit und statt dessen dazu beruft, durch 
konkretisierung des Gemeinschaftswillens das Recht schopferisch 
zu gestalten, gibt ihm nur scheinbar groBere Macht. Der "Wille 
der Volksgemeinschaft" erschopft sich in mythischer Beschwôrung. 
Er bezeichnet keinen soziologisch bestimmbaren, realen Willen der 
Mehrheit, sondern offenbart sich fortgesetzt im Willen des 
Führers" (H. Rüping, Zur Praxis der Strafiustiz im "Dritten 
Reich". in Recht und Justiz. im "Dritten Reicht". ed. by R. 
Dreier and W. Sellert, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1989, p.181).
For the theoretical grounds for the National-Socialist 
rejection of the principle nullum crimen nulla poena sine leae. 
cf. G. Dahm, Beibehaltunq Oder Abschaffuna des Grundsatzes: 
"Nulla poena sine leae", in Deutsche Landesreferate zum II. 
Internationalen Kongrefi für Rechtsveraleichuna im Haag 1937. ed. 
by E. Heymann, de Gruyter, Berlin and Leipzig 1937, p.514 ff. , 
and C. Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas 
Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlaq eines politischen Symbols. 2nd ed., 
Hohenheim, Cologne 1982, p.110.




























































































bringing about the penalty. Indeed the penalty and the 
wrongfulness, on this view, ultimately coincide. For both 
constitute loss of the community link by the subject, with the 
difference that one (the wrongful act) is the internal 
manifestation of this event (loss of the "existential" connection 
between individual and community), while the penalty is its 
external manifestation, "visible to all" - as Larenz is fond of 
saying. As we know, the subject, according to our German lawyer, 
exists only within the community, and has no autonomous 
ontological status. Accordingly the wrongful act, which consists 
in negation by the individual of his own membership in the 
community order, will as an (automatic) effect have the 
dissolution of the subject as such, his ontological end. Death, 
(in the extreme case of capital punishment), on this view, does 
no more than sanction the fact already accomplished, and 
accomplished, to boot, by the subject himself: the loss of the 
subject as subject in the community (which, according to Larenz, 
is his only possible existence). In a certain sense, on our 
German lawyer's view, one might say that by committing the 
wrongful act the subject "annihilates himself", by voluntarily 
and consciously destroying his own existence (which is here the 
only one possible) as member of the community. All the penalty 
would do would be to make this "suicide" effective. For it 
sanctions the reduction or loss of legal subjectivity, or in 
other words, on Larenz's doctrine, the dissolution of the 
existence (first social and then physical) of the culprit.
In the criminal law of the Enlightenment tradition, the 
penalty does not by itself attack the legal subjectivity of the 
condemned, and even where, as frequently occurs, it reduces it, 
that happens as a collateral effect. In the new legal order 
advocated by Larenz, the penalty always coincides with the 
reduction (which may go as far as annihilation) of the 
subjectivity of the condemned. What in criminal law of the 
Enlightenment, liberal tradition are only collateral and 
contingent effects of the penalty are instead, in National 
Socialist doctrine, consubstantial with the penalty. "According 




























































































adjudicating body with so-called "accessory consequences" 
(Nebenfolgen), such as the incapacity to render military service 
or hold public office, incapacity to be a witness, guardian or 
trustee, loss of parental rights, subjection to police 
surveillance, etc. Conviction for a serious crime involves, 
according to the Reichserbhofqesetz. loss of capacity to be a 
farmer, leading to deprivation of administration of the farm 
(Hof) and of its usufruct. All these so-called "accessory 
consequences" are in fact essential to the penalty. In them, the 
penalty is again shown to be something completely different from 
infliction of any harm whatever. It reduces the culprit's 
position, both legally and as a member (Rechts- und 
Gliedstelluna^. Accordingly, the penalty is not irrelevant for 
legal capacity"49.
The penalty is not "irrelevant" (bedeutunaslos) for legal 
capacity, in the National Socialist lawyer's view, for three 
chief reasons, (a) Firstly, because legal capacity is not 
conceived of as something that is in some way independent of 
intervention by State bodies, be it that of the legislator or of 
the judge, so that the penalty (intervention by a state agency) 
cannot revoke what the state agency does not have the power to 
bestow (namely the capacity). In Larenz's conception, legal 
capacity is seen as something depending entirely on positive law, 
even if this is ideologically50 conceived as a "concrete order" 
and not as the command or decision of a sovereign will. Capacity 
is, according to him, a function of the subject's position within 
the community, of which the law is the order and the "meaning". 
Capacity, just as it has been given, can also be taken away from 
the individual. In this connection Larenz criticizes his master, 
Julius Binder. Binder felt that such penalties as banishment or
49 VWDS, p. 38 .
50 I am here referring to a notion of "ideology" fairly 
close to what Karl Mannheim defines as the "particular conception 
of ideology", consisting in a form of lying or disguising of 
reality; See K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction 
to the Sociology of Knowledge. Routledge, London and New York 




























































































conscription "are not in accordance with the idea of law"51, 
since the quality of being a legal subject is in his opinion 
strictly connected with that of being human. Just as the latter 
cannot be denied, so equally the human being cannot be denied, 
over and above his humanity, the quality of being a legal 
subject. According to Binder one is a subject of rights because 
one is a human being, irrespective of any intervention by the 
positive legal order. Thus, legal subjectivity remains outwith 
the scope of the law. Larenz objects to this position of Binder's 
by restating an idea which is the guiding theme of his doctrine: 
"A man is a member of the legal community I Rechtsaenosse) not as 
man in general, but as a member of the people in which he is born 
and towards which he is responsible as an ethical being"52.
(b) The second reason why, in our German jurist's theory, 
the penalty is not "irrelevant" for legal capacity is that, 
according to him, legal capacity is not the general and abstract 
capacity to have subjective rights (typical of liberal 
orders)53 54, but the capacity to occupy different "loci" (Orte) in 
the community. In legal orders in the Enlightenment tradition, 
general legal capacity and specific capacities do not coincide: 
general legal capacity is not the sum of the special legal 
capacities, so that a reduction in the latter does not encroach 
on legal capacity as such (which is general), which subsists - 
as Hannah Arendt has noted - in the "right to have rights"34. In
51 J. Binder, Philosonhie des Rechts. Stilke, Berlin 1925, 
p.665.
52 VWDS, pp.38-39.
53 A paradigmatic definition in this connection is the one
given by Francesco Messineo, that legal capacity "is the 
capability (or suitability) to be a subject of subjective rights 
in general" (F. Messineo, Manuale di diritto civile e 
commerciale. vol.l, 8th ed. , Giuffre, Milano 1950, p.217,
emphasis in the original).
54 Cf. H. Arendt, Es gibt nur ein einziqes Menschenrecht■ 
now in Praktische Philosophie/Ethik. ed. by 0. Hòffe, G. 




























































































liberal systems this general right acknowledged, albeit with many 
reservations and limitations, to every person (even the non­
citizen) is never entirely eliminated by the penalty. The 
converse is true in the theoretical view of National Socialism.
For Larenz, general legal capacity, specifically as the 
capacity to have rights, as a "universal, abstract" concept, 
should be banned from the legal system55. In its place should be 
set the special capacities to occupy certain "functions" in the 
community. Thus there are no longer general capacities but only 
special capacities in the Nazi legal system: no longer capacities 
for rights. but capacities for "positions as member" 
(Gliedstellungen) in the context of the community56. In this 
system, then, when a special capacity is reduced or eliminated, 
the general legal capacity of the subject is ipso facto reduced, 
since it does not exist other than as the sum of special 
capacities. The reduction or elimination of a special capacity 
consequent upon the penalty here has the effect of a reduction 
in the general subjectivity (where "general" is to be understood 
in the sense of "total"). While in the liberal order the 
deprivation of, let us say, parental rights does not encroach 
more than slightly on the subject's general legal capacity (as 
"right to have rights"), in the so-called "community order" 
advocated by Larenz, this law has, so to speak, the effect of 
mutilating a part of the subject's ontological structure.
(c) The third reason why the penalty is not "irrelevant" for 
legal capacity lies in the fact that the penalty, in Larenz's 
conception, in itself consists essentially in being a reduction 
of legal capacity. "The penalty has the unconditional meaning of
ff.
55 Cf. K. Larenz, Zur Logik des konkreten Begriffs. Eine 
Voruntersuchung zur Rechtsphilosophie. in "Deutsche 
Rechtswissenschaft", vol.5, 1940, p.287 ff.





























































































rendering the person's responsibility visible and effective"57. 
The person's responsibility in this case lies in the fact of 
having broken the bond of solidarity binding him organically to 
the community. The penalty ought, then, to make "visible" the 
breaking of that bond. But the bond is the basis on which the 
individual's subjectivity is erected, the substance of which it 
consists. The breaking of that "existential" bond accordingly 
signifies dissolution of the very foundation of subjectivity, and 
hence its degradation or destruction, or at any rate a 
"diminution" of it. In this sense, whoever commits a crime at the 
same time commits an action against himself, since by attacking 
the bond linking him to the community he attacks his own 
subjectivity and his very existence. "Through the crime the 
author loosens or destroys his membership in the community. He 
thereby turns against himself, something he learns through the 
penalty"58. The penalty, the intrinsic object of which is to 
make the "loosening" or "destruction" of the culprit's membership 
in the community visible, has then to make specific and effective 
that "loosening" or "destruction". The penalty is, on this view, 
directed immediately and principally against the culprit's legal 
subjectivity. "The penalty makes the meaning of an act effective 
for the person who has committed it; it is, accordingly, the 
reduction or annihilation of the culprit's position as member, 
of his being a member, of the legal community f Rechtsgenosse) , 
as the inwardly necessary consequence Cals die innerliche 
notwendicre Folge) of the action against the community for which 
he is called on to answer"59.
This means conceiving the penalty as a stigma. or as that 
procedure which renders the subject's guilt perceptible and 
visibile. and sanctions the guilty person's separation from the
57 VWDS , p. 39 .
58 Ibid. Cf. also K. Larenz, Deutsche Rechtserneueruna -and 
Rechtsphilosophie . pp.41-42.




























































































community, brought about by himself by the very fact of his 
criminal conduct. Once the penalty is conceived of as a stigma, 
Larenz re-assesses the medieval punishments, both those aimed at 
degrading the condemned person's dignity (the pillory, for 
instance), and corporal ones (like mutilation of part of the 
body). In his view, these paramountly achieved the characteristic 
function of penalty, namely that of marking the condemned 
person's guilt, of making it clear to all the rest of the 
community. "Consider the pillory, the parading of a criminal 
through the streets of the town, cutting out the tongue or 
cutting off the right hand. To us these penalties appear only as 
manifestations of medieval cruelty; at their own time, however, 
they were expressions of a community reference of the crime and 
of the punishment. They make explicit the punishment's symbolic 
nature and its function of rendering the criminal act 
visible"60. In this view, in which the penalty is understood as 
a stigma, the meaning of criminal judicial procedure and penalty 
measures changes radically. First of all, the liberal idea so 
effectively expressed by Franz von Liszt that "the criminal code 
is the criminal's Magna Carta"61 is overturned. Criminal law is 
conversely conceived by Nazi jurists as a weapon of the community 
against the criminal, who is its mortal enemy. Accordingly, the 
presumption of innocence of an accused person not yet condemned 
falls62. The penalty (for instance detention) no longer means 
deprivation of an individual's fundamental object of legal 
protection (freedom of movement, in the case of detention), but 
is seen as an expedient to make effective and to sanction the
60 VWDS, p.37.
61 F. von Liszt, Ueber den Einfluss der sozioloaischen und 
anthropologischen Forschunaen auf die Grundbeariffe des 
Strafrechts. in F. von Liszt, Strafrechtliche Aufsàtze und 
Vortrage, Vol.2, J. Guttentag, Berlin 1905, p.80.
62 Cf. E. Wolf, Zur Stellunq des Beschuldiqten im 
Strafverfahren. Bemerkungen zu einer Schrift von August Hegler. 





























































































separation from the community that the guilty person is held 
already to have brought about through his criminal act. And the 
public nature of the criminal trial, seen in liberal orders as 
a mechanism in favour of the accused, is instead seen by Larenz 
as one of the necessary conditions for making public, "visible 
to all", the condemnation of the culprit and hence his removal 
from the community63. The trial, in this conception, makes the
63 The substantialist, idealist and sociologizing conception 
of substantive law corresponds in National-Socialist doctrine 
with a functionalist vision of procedural law, and in general of 
all legal formality, which is attributed a value only in relation 
to the results, or else for the portion of substantive law 
(consisting in the principles and "life" of the 
Volksaemeinschaft) that can be achieved through it. Thus the 
criminal trial is conceived on the model of an administrative 
measure directed towards bringing about a definite goal, in this 
case the maintenance of the political and racial "integrity" of 
the "community". This has the consequence of subordinating and 
possibly sacrificing procedure to the attaining of the end in 
question, leading to the so-called Auflockeruna (loosening) of 
procedure that became an official conception in Nazi legal 
doctrine. "If the outcome of the trial," Hinrich Ruping writes 
in this connection, "becomes decisive, the procedural forms no 
longer have a value in themselves but are always let fall where 
a conflict arises" (H. Ruping, "Auflockerung" im 
Strafverfahrensrecht. Grundsatzliche Entwicklunqen zwischen 
Liberalismus. "deutschen Gemeinrecht" und Naturrecht. in Recht, 
Rechtsphilosophie und Nationalsozialismus. ed. by H. 
Rottleuthner, p.68). The trial is conceived of as a "fight of the 
people against the criminal" (E. Wolf, Zur Stellung des 
Beschuldiaten im Strafverfahren. p.178). Thus "the fundamental 
principles of the criminal trial ought not to be based on the 
exceptional case where the accused is innocent. They must count 
on the normal case that the accused is guilty" (E. Wolf, 




























































































punishment become a "public spectacle"64, thereby acquiring its 
nature as a sticrma.
4. Justification and legitimation of punishment: an "absolute" 
theory
Larenz rejects the so-called "relative" theories of
punishment (where, as we know, the maxim punitur ne peccetur 
applies) that is, those theories that do not attribute an
intrinsic ethical value to punishment as such. These, on his 
view, fail to understand properly the relationship set up between 
the crime (or guilt) and punishment. "Relative theories conceive 
the relationship between the crime and its punishment as a loose 
connection that does not determine the essence of the 
penalty"65. As we have seen above, Larenz rejects the
utilitarian basis of punishment, in particular its two most
important variants: the theory of punishment as intimidation and 
the theory of punishment as rehabilitation. As far as the theory 
of intimidation is concerned, he certainly recognizes that every 
punishment is accompanied by an intimidatory effect. He further 
accepts that the penalty always pursues the aim of protecting 
from crime society as a whole and also its components taken 
individually. "This aim is in a certain sense natural for
64 On punishment as a "public spectacle", cf. K. Larenz, 
Deutsche Rechtserneueruna und Rechtsphilosophie. p.42, note 1. 
In Larenz's doctrine the penalty again takes on the 
characteristics of medieval torture. What Foucault writes in 
connection with the tortures carried out in the European kingdoms 
up to and beyond the threshold of the Enlightenment also holds 
for the model of punishment advocated by Larenz, if in Foucault's 
framework the prince is replaced by the "national community" and 
its Führer. Cf. M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de 
la prison. Gallimard, Paris 1975, p.52. In particular, what 
Foucault says is one of the characteristics of the "torture", 
namely the function of driving to an extreme the asymmetry 
between the subject who has dared to break the law and the 
prince, applies to Larenz's model of punishment.




























































































punishment, but it tells us nothing about its nature, considering 
that many other measures may pursue the same aim"66. Larenz also 
denies that punishment can have a rehabilitative character. This 
is for a very simple reason: education presupposes the 
incorporation of the person being educated into the community to 
which and in which he is being educated, while punishment 
consists in the separation of the condemned person from the 
community, in removing him from the life of relationships which, 
however, is essential to education. "Punishment, by its very 
nature, is anything but an appropriate form of education. For 
education to community - and that is the only kind to be 
considered - can succeed only within a specific community. But 
the penalty excludes the criminal from that very community"67.
Larenz instead concurs with the so-called "absolute" theory 
of penalty (for which the maxim ounitur quia peccatum applies), 
that is, the theories that consider that the justification for 
the penalty lies within itself, as a moral reaction to the crime. 
However, our German jurist is not completely satisfied with the 
traditional "absolute" theories. For in his view these consider 
the crime and the culprit in isolation from the life context they 
fit into, atomistically. They see the crime purely as the action 
of an individual committing an individual act abstractly 
conceived, which with logical necessity brings about the 
consequence of the penalty. "But the act takes on the character 
of crime not as the isolated action of an individual, but as the 
conduct to which a member of the community must respond, which 
modifies the latter's relationship with the community"68. The 
"absolute" theories, then - according to our German jurist - 
should be purged of their individualistic outlook and developed 
by adding in a "communitaristic" Weltanschauung. The basis for 
the penalty lies not - according to Larenz - in the act as such,
66 VWDS, p . 40 .
67 Ibid.




























































































but in the culprit's responsibility for his or her anti-social 
(or better "anti-community") conduct, a responsibility regarded 
as possible only where the culprit is regarded primarily as the 
responsible member (and hence still endowed with independent 
capacity to understand and intend) of the "community".
Larenz's theory of penalty, like much of his doctrine 
developed between the second half of the '20s and the first half 
of the '40s of this century69, is influenced by and derived from 
Hegelian philosophy70. The relationship with that philosophy is
69 A distinction should however be drawn between Larenz's 
thought as expressed first in K. Larenz, Heaels Zurechnunaslehre 
und der Beariff der obiektiven Zurechnuna. Ein Beitraa zur 
Rechtsphilosoahie des Kritischen Idealismus und zur Lehre von der 
"iuristischen Kausalitat"■ Deichert, Leipzig 1927, and later in, 
for instance, VWDS. The difference between Larenz's work written 
on the very threshold of the '30s and that written later lies 
particularly in the interpretation of the Hegelian "morality" as 
a "community of blood and fate" and in the stress on the anti- 
individualistic, fatalistic and deterministic elements in 
Hegelian idealism, which he arrives at as from the very early 
'30s. In Larenz as Nazi there is an attempt to present Hegel as 
a precursor of race doctrines, maintaining that the German 
philosopher had conceived the concept of Volksaeist not as a mere 
spiritual phenomenon but as "the intimate vital, animating 
principle of a form of people that already lies in the natural 
phenomenon" (K. Larenz, Die Bedeutuna der volkischen Sitte in 
Heaels Staatsphilosophie. in "Zeitschrift fur die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft", vol. 98, 1938, p.134; emphasis in the 
original). To see the difference between these two periods in the 
German jurist's thought (before and after 1933), compare the two 
editions of K. Larenz, Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der 
Geaenwart. Junker and Dunnhaupt, Berlin 1931, and Berlin 1935.
70 On the Hegelianism of Larenz (and his teacher at 
Gottingen Julius Binder), there is an effective account in E. 
Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Heaels als Heilslehre und 
Herrschaftsideoloqie. 2nd enlarged edition, R. Piper, Munich 
1981, p .86 ff. On this see also the work by H. Kiesewetter, Von 
Hegel zu Hitler. Eine Analyse der Heaelschen Machtstaatsideoloaie 
und der politischen Wirkunasaeschichte des Rechtsheaelianismus. 
Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg 1974, p.267 ff. (on Binder), p.287 
ff. (on Larenz). On the legal doctrine of Binder and Larenz, cf. 
M. Stolleis, Gemeinwohlformeln im nationalsozialistischen Recht. 
cit. , p .50 ff. On the Hegelianism of National-Socialist legal 
doctrine, the considerations by R. Treves, La filosofia di Hegel 
e le nuove concezioni tedesche del diritto e dello Stato, in 
Annali dell'Istituto di scienze giuridiche, economiche, politiche 
e sociali. voi.8, 1934/1935, Principato, Messina 1935, p.293 ff., 




























































































inter alia explicitly claimed by the German jurist in referring 
to this distinction between "relative" and "absolute" theories 
of penalty. Declaring his aversion for the former and sympathy 
for the latter, he recalls that Hegel's should be numbered among 
the latter, as the most important of them. "It is from Hegel that 
the awareness comes that the penalty is not an external 
consequence of the crime, but reveals its intimate nature"71.
Larenz distinguishes two periods in Hegel's work: the young 
Hegel, represented as far as legal philosophy and the theory of 
penalty is concerned in particular by the Theoloaische 
Juaendschriften. and the Hegel of the Grundlinien der Philosoohie 
des Rechts. The "absolute" theory of penalty finds, in Larenz's 
view, its clearest, most unequivocal manifestation in Hegel's 
youthful work. Here the penalty is seen as the culprit's self- 
destruction of his own life, so that the penalty is an absolutely 
necessary consequence of the crime. The penalty is conceived by 
the young Hegel as "destiny" (Schicksal) of the culprit72 and as 
a reaction of the crime onto the one who has committed it. "The 
criminal", writes Larenz, "appears here not as a single 
individual who has through his act caused harm solely to another 
individual or to the State set up against him as an external
diritto di Julius Binder, in Studi giuridici dedicati dai 
discepoli alla memoria di Gino Seqrè. Giuffré, Milano 1943, p.87 
ff. , and especially R. Dreier, Julius Binder (1870-1939). Ein 
Rechtsphilosoph zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus. in 
Rechtswissenschaft in Gottingen. Gòttinaer Juristen aus 250 
Jahren. ed. by F. Loos, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1987, 
pp.435-455.
71 VWDS, p.43.
72 Cf. K. Larenz, Staat und Religion bei Hegel. Ein Beitraq
zur____ svstematischen____ Interpretation____ der____Heqelschen
Rechtsphilosophie. in Rechtsidee und Staatsqedanke. Beitraqe zur 
Rechtsphilosophie und zur politischen Ideenqeschichte. Festaabe 
für Julius Binder, ed. by Larenz, Junker and Dünnhaupt, Berlin 
1930, p . 259. On the "young Hegel" as seen and used by Larenz, cf. 
K. Larenz, Die Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie des deutschen 
Idealismus und ihre Geqenwartsbedeutung■ in G. Holstein, K. 





























































































power, but as bearer of the supra individual life from which he 
separates himself by his very act, so that he thereby destroys 
the foundation of his own life. This is the profoundest 
justification of penalty conceivable"73.
This position, though still an influence on and in part 
present in the thought of the mature Hegel, was subsequently 
modified by the fact that both crime and punishment are, in the 
edifice of Hegel's philosophical system, transferred onto the 
level of the so-called "abstract law". At this level, the 
individual is no longer seen - Larenz maintains - as the member 
of a specific community (family, tribe or "gens" (Sipped. people, 
State) but as an individual (who as a rational and "universal 
abstract" being is equal to all other individuals), that is, as 
a "person". In Hegel's concept of person there is an ambivalence: 
on the one hand the individual is considered as something unique 
existing on its own account, accordingly a "concrete" concept, 
and on the other the individual as a rational being is considered 
as equal to other individuals, all endowed with the same reason, 
and is accordingly an "abstract" concept74. The nature of 
Hegel's "abstract law" arises, according to Larenz, from this 
very ambivalence in his view present in Hegel's thought: between 
the individual as rational being, and hence between the abstract 
universality of the "person", and the individual as specific, 
unique being. Thus, in "abstract law" the individual as such is 
superposed on the individual understood as universality of will 
and reason.
On this ambivalence of the concept of person, Hegel 
constructs the very possibility of crime and the justification 
of penalty. In crime, the possibility is realized of a 
discrepancy between the two aspects making up the person, its
73 VWDS, pp.43-44. Emphasis in the original.
74 On the opposition between "concrete" concepts and 
"abstract" concepts in the doctrine of Larenz (who fights to 
eliminate "abstract" concepts), cf. K. Larenz, Zur Loaik des 
konkreten Beariffs. p.279 ff. Cf. also K. Larenz, Über Geaenstand 




























































































"particularity" as a single, unique individual and its 
universality as a rational being. The crime in Hegel's system 
appears when the universal will and the particular will in the 
person diverge. The particular will in the Hegelian system has 
legal value, that is, belongs to the sphere of the objective 
spirit, only when it coincides with the universal will manifested 
in the law. In crime, then, the particular will, which dissents 
from universal will, does not manage to take on true reality, but 
is instead a nullity. "This nullity of the crime", comments 
Larenz, "is manifested in the penalty, which, as annihilation of 
what is in itself null, accomplishes the actual self-destruction 
of the crime and thereby simultaneously the production and 
realization of the objective right which takes on existence in 
the penalty75." The penalty is however for Hegel not only the 
production of objective law. It is also and particularly the 
reaffirmation of the abstract personality of the culprit, who as 
a "universal" must will the necessary consequences of his act and 
is through his punishment recognized as a responsible being76.
Larenz, though feeling very close to Hegel's theses, 
nonetheless does not recognize himself fully in his philosophy 
of penalty. This is particularly because it treats the individual 
at the level of "abstract law", not that of "morality". In doing 
so Hegel (a) recognizes the individual as "person" and hence as 
a being equal to others of his kind, (b) posits a counterposition 
between individual and law (State), and (c) sees the penalty as 
something reaching the individual from outside and hence in need 
of justification. "This sequence of ideas," writes Larenz, 
"contains the correct opinion that crime, as the individual's 
revolt against the will of the law, destroys itself. But this 
self-destruction of the crime can be understood in its essence 
only when the criminal is seen not as an abstract person but as
75 VWDS, p . 44 .
76 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts . 





























































































an actual member of the community who through his act not only 
comes into contradiction with the abstract "law as such" but 
separates himself from the actual community and thereby 
annihilates the basis of his own life"77.
The criminal, continues the German jurist, as a rational 
universal being, as abstract person, coincides with the law. As 
long as he continues to be such (a rational, universal being), 
he cannot become a criminal. In fact, the criminal as such is - 
in the Hegelian perspective - a mere single, particular will, 
which stands for itself, and is through the penalty forced to 
succumb by the dominating power of the universal will. "Inasmuch 
as the criminal has committed the crime and is punished, he is 
not rational and universal but an individual; inasmuch as he is 
a rational universal who wills the right, his own universality, 
he cannot commit a crime, and the penalty cannot affect him"78. 
This contradiction cannot in Larenz's view be got round other 
than by transferring the level at which the individual is placed 
from the aspect of "abstract law" to that of "morality". "It is 
only at the level of morality, in the actual community, that the 
individual as individual person is at the same time a member of 
the community and accordingly an actual universal"79.
At the level of "morality", the opposition between the 
individual as a separate individual and the abstract universality 
of law dissolves. This opposition would in Larenz's view 
undermine the justificatory foundation of the penalty or - more 
exactly - render impossible the absolute basis for the penalty, 
namely a basis for the penalty that lies within the latter 
itself. In this case the problem would inevitably arise of the 
justification of the penalty in relation to the individual's 
singularity. The penalty could no longer be justified for itself 
but would have to come to grips with the individual that
77 VWDS, p.45.
78 Ibid.




























































































undergoes it and be justified with respect to him. This is 
unwelcome to Larenz, who instead goes in search of the 
"profoundest possible justification of the penalty"80, and, we 
may add, the "profoundest possible justification" of political 
power and of the law. The German jurist in fact seeks more to rid 
himself of the problem of "justification" CRechtfertiaunj) . which 
to some extent requires an "object" which it is proposed to 
"justify" (or legitimize) to be singled out as a problem and put 
in question, in this case the institutions of a particular social 
organization. The Nazi jurist wishes to supply law and political 
authority with the foundation that natural events enjoy81: the 
cogency of causality, faced with which there can never be any 
question of "justification" or of legitimation, as instead arises 
in the case of human action.
By shifting the individual, within the. Hegelian system, from 
the level of "abstract law" to that of "morality", Larenz to his 
mind resolves the opposition between concrete particular will and 
abstract universal will. On the level of "morality" the 
individual is no longer regarded as an isolated individual but 
as a member of a community, and is hence at the same time 
"concrete" and "universal", and is indeed the "actual universal" 
in which particularity and universality merge.
The Hegelian dualism of a particular will counterposed to 
the universal will, which constitutes the essence of "abstract 
law", is, for the theory of penalty, heavy with implications that 
Larenz does not hesitate to call "fatal". In the Hegelian 
conception, he writes, the offender as an individual, or as a
80 VWDS, p . 44
81 This is a typical feature of the Nazi Weltanschauung. 
Hans Frank, for instance, Minister of Justice of the Reich 
organizer of the "Deutsche Rechtserneueruna" movement and, later 
on, "Generalgouverneur" for the Polish territories occupied by 
the German army, compared the "efficacy over time of the 
revolutionary conception put forward by Adolf Hitler in his laws 
with the power of the laws of nature" (H. Frank, Fondamento 
giuridico dello Stato nazionalsocialista. It. trans, by L.L. 




























































































particular will, finds himself in the position of an object vis- 
à-vis the universal abstract will of law. The penalty has 
accordingly the purpose of dissolving the individual in his 
particularity and thereby reaffirming the power of the universal 
will and its mastery over the particular will. In this view, 
penalty takes on the connotation of reprisal. It is harm 
inflicted on the culprit to make him feel his "nullity" in the 
face of the power of the law and of the State. This is the 
interpretation of Hegel's theory of penalty supplied by Larenz, 
who objects to it as follows. "But the offender is not thereby 
regarded as a member of the community who through his crime has 
modified his position in the community, but as an individual with 
respect to whom the community appears as an external power, 
namely as the abstract universal, for the purpose of making him 
submit to itself"82. In this way Hegel is seen as denying the 
unity of the "supra-individual life" that he had instead affirmed 
in his youthful works. But above all, according to Larenz, "this 
means that the deeper idea that the offender through his crime 
separates himself from his basis of life, and learns through the 
penalty what he has done, is lost"83.
In Hegel's theory of "abstract law", the penalty, in 
Larenz's view, no longer appears as a compliment to or ulterior 
effect of the offender's criminal act, but as a measure by an 
authority outside the actor (the offender) and counterposed to 
him. But this - and here is Larenz's chief concern - means the 
losing of that "absolute" justificatory basis of penalty that is 
the ambitious aim of our Nazi jurist's theoretical construction. 
Where the penalty is regarded as the "self-destruction" of the 
culprit, coming about automatically once the condition of 
wrongfulness is met, the penalty no longer needs any further
82 VWDS, p . 46 .
83 VWDS, p .47. However, according to Larenz, there always 
remains, at the centre of Hegel's philosophy of law, the "idea 
of the moral tonality, of the community of a people that lives 
everywhere" (K. Larenz, Heaelianismus und preufiische Staatsidee. 
Die Staatsohilosophie Joh. Ed. Erdmanns und das Heaelbild des 19. 





























































































justification. This is for two reasons: (a) because it arises 
with the force of the laws of nature that govern the physical 
life of the subject who offends and (b) because it is desired and 
executed (through the criminal act) by the very subject who 
undergoes it. The culprit committing a crime that is above all 
"anti-community conduct" deliberately separates himself from the 
"community of the people" fVolksqemeinschafti and thereby 
destroys his own reason for being, his ontological basis, which 
lies in the link with the "community", in being an expression of 
it. The penalty, which is above all the annihilation of 
subjectivity, does no more than make the breaking of the 
existential link brought about by the crime clear and effective. 
Accordingly, the penalty has no need for justification vis-à-vis 
the culprit, for it is not bestowed by a subject other than the 
criminal himself, as instead happens in Hegel's theory of 
"abstract law". The penalty in Larenz's conception is the "fate" 
of the culprit, and he can neither rebel against it nor in any 
way withdraw from it. In the face of fate he must bow his head.
5. The offender as "enemy"
I shall run through the main passages in Larenz's theory of 
penalty. I shall not dwell further on its overwhelmingly 
ideological nature because I feel it emerges unequivocally from 
the German jurist's own prose. It is clear, for instance, that 
the "fate" that Larenz sees as realized in the penalty and to 




























































































arbitrariness of the total State84, "incarnated" in the person 
of the Führer ■ a new "mystic body"85.
84 Cf. E. Forsthoff, Per totale Staat. p.29 ff. The Nazi 
State is "total" in a twofold sense: (a) that it embraces the 
whole range of social relations in a given territory (and 
therefore total because it hs competence over every area; in this 
connection see also J. Binder, Per deutsche Volksstaat. J.C.B. 
Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen 1934, p.31 ff.); (b) that its 
activity does not meet with any human limits whatever (total, 
therefore, because its powers may take on any content whatever). 
This is made clear by the following formulation by Erik Wolf : 
"The right (Anspruch) of the National-Socialist State covers the 
entire earthly existence of man. It finds no limit either in 
historical traditions or in any fundamental rights or human 
rights" (E. Wolf, Pas Rechtsideal des nationalsozialistischen 
Staates. in "Archiv fiir Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie", voi.28, 
1934/1935, p.355).
85 The Führer "incarnates" the "spirit of the people" 
fVolksgeist) or "race soul" (Rassenseele1, or "Gothic soul" 
fqotische Seelel (as stated by W. Sauer, Schòpferisches Volkstum 
als national- und weltpolitisches Prinzip. Zur Klarunq der
rechts-____und____sozialphilosophischen____Grundlaaen____der
nationalsozialistischen Bewegung. in "Archiv fur Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie", voi.27, 1933/1934, p.24 and p.28); the "legal 
conception of the people" (E. Wolf, op.ult.cit.. p.352); and, in 
Larenz's version, "the concrete unwritten idea of law of his 
people" (K. Larenz, Peutsche Rechtserneueruna und 
Rechtsphilosoohie. p.34). Or again, in Binder's doctrine, the 
Führer is "incarnation of his nation, of its common will, of the 
will to freedom and assertion" (J. Binder, Per Idealismus als 
Grundlaae der Staatsphilosophie. in "Zeitschrift fur Peutsche 
Kulturphilosophie", vol.l, 1935, p.157). On the Führer as a 
metaphysical entity cf. also A. Capizzi, Alle radici ideologiche 
dei fascismi. Il mito della libertà individuale da Constant a 
Hitler. Savelli, Roma 1977, p.151 ff. The central thesis of this 
book, that the cultural roots of National-Socialism and of 
fascism arise from liberal (in particular Constant) and 
libertarian (Stirner and Proudhon) thought, is highly disputable, 
not to say so much hot air.
Nazi ideology takes over, adapting them to its purposes, a 
series of myths (and rites) of Christian doctrine (and liturgy). 
This is noted by G.L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses. 
Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the 
Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich. Howard Fertig, New York 
1975, p . 204 ff. There is a stimulating page in this connection 
by E.M. Remarque in Pie Nacht von Lissabon. Ullstein, Frankfurt 
am Main 1978, p.40. On the role of myths and rites in the 
ideology of totalitarian regimes, and in particular Nazi regime, 
there is the important last chapter of E. Cassirer, The Mvth of 





























































































The essential points of Larenz's conception, as far as the 
theory of the criminal law of the Volksaemeinschaft is concerned, 
are as follows, (a) Larenz does not exclude personal liability 
as regards the commission of the crime, or better considers that 
the deliberateness and willedness of the act, and accordingly a 
capable subject, are necessary conditions for imputing a 
crime86. (b) Once the crime is committed, the penalty is 
conceived of as the necessary consequence, or "meaning", of the 
crime. Accordingly, at the level of penal procedure, the point 
is not, on this view, to decide the penalty, but only to accept 
it. Similarly, on the moral plane, the point is not - in the 
framework of this doctrine - to justify the penalty, but to 
recognize it through an intellectual proceeding which cannot be 
arbitrary and evaluative but must instead be objective and 
cognitive. In this way the legal and moral responsibility of the 
person establishing the penalty for the specific case, the 
individual responsibility of the one deciding on the life and 
property of others, is mitigated, indeed entirely thrown out in 
favour of a presumed objective course of events, the sole 
efficient cause of which - nota bene - is considered as being the 
subject committing the offence. On him, then, as Larenz several 
times says, the effects of the events that he, the culprit, has 
set in motion "redound". Thus while on the one hand Larenz 
maintains individual responsibility as far as the subject 
committing the crime is concerned, he instead denies this 
responsibility (more on the moral than the legal side) as regards 
the subject who has to establish and apply the penalty. Here 
there is a paradoxical absolutization as far as the judge is 
concerned of the moral (or amoral depending on the point of view) 
attitude typical of legal positivism, for which "law is law" 
(Gesetz ist Gesetz) and there is no need to ask questions of 
ethical justification in connection with the application of a 
positive norm. In Larenz's theory the Gesetz of positive law, 
which is a human law, becomes a law of nature, and still more a
86 According to Erik Wolf too, "only he who acts in 





























































































law of fate, which the judge accordingly cannot (not according 
to the norms of the positive legal order, but in virtue of the 
superior cogency of the causal nexus between the facts of nature 
or of the supranatural force of fate) escape.
As far as the position of the individual offender within 
such a theory is concerned, the following must be said, (i) 
Larenz, as we have seen, accepts personal responsibility in the 
commission of the crime, or considers the voluntary nature of the 
act as one of the conditions of guilt and of the crime. However, 
the responsibility for the criminal act is not here the result 
of a norm, is not derived from some human rule (whether or not 
enshrined in the law) but is rooted in the ontological nature of 
the culprit, i.e. his being a member of the "community of the 
people"87. The crime is the breaking of the link binding the 
individual to his community, and the penalty has the task of 
making that break effective and evident to the eyes of all 
members of the Volksaemeinschaft. That is, the penalty is 
conceived of by Larenz as a mark of the anti-social nature of the 
criminal, as a stigma. Hence the support he gives to the public 
execution of the penalty, as against its progressive
87 For this reason, Larenz has considerable problems in 
bringing the criminal responsibility of the foreigner under this 
concept of his. The latter cannot in fact be termed a member of 
the Volksaemeinschaft and hence - if Larenz's theory were applied 
to the letter - would have to be regarded as a non-imputable, 
criminally irresponsible subject. The German jurist overcomes 
this difficulty by maintaining that the foreigner enjoys a 
particular "guest right" (Gastrecht), by the granting of which 
a relationship is established between the former and the host 
community. One may, Larenz then affirms, accept the criminal 
responsibility of the foreigner without bringing into discussion 
the objective basis of the criminal responsibility which lies in 
the "existential" relationship between the subject and the 
community. On this cf. VWDS, p.42. Similar problems connected 
with the criminal responsibility of the foreigner in terms of 
"treason" are gone into by Georg Dahm, one of the most radical 
Nazi theoreticians of the "new" criminal law: cf. G. Dahm, Verrat 
und Verbrechen■ in "Zeitschrift fur die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft", vol.95, 1935, p.308 ff. On the legal 
conditions of the "foreigner" in Nazi legal doctrine, see also 
K. Michaelis, Die Pberwinduna der Beariffe Rechtsfahiakeit und 
Parteifahigkeit. in "Deutsche Rechtwissenschaft", vol.2, 1937, 




























































































"privatization" in liberal systems (one need think only of the 
practice of capital punishment in liberal democratic States 
confined within the screening walls of a prison)88, and to 
penalties which physically or morally mark the individual's 
separateness from the community (the pillory, hand amputation, 
etc.).
(ii) Since the crime means the breaking of the individual's 
community link and this link represents the individual's 
ontological foundation, the penalty is then directed immediately 
and chiefly against the culprit's subjectivity. The penalty is - 
in this view - an attack on the criminal's humanity, aggression 
against his being a human being, and therefore runs from 
degradation of that human dignity up to total physical 
annihilation. "It [the penalty] thus dissolves or restricts the 
culprit's membership in the community. According to its nature, 
it is diminution CMinderunai or annihilation fVernichtuna1 of the 
position as member !Gliedstellunal of the culprit in the 
community. It is not any harm whatever that is inflicted on the 
culprit, but a limitation of his legal position and position as 
member, which merely expresses the extent to which the offender 
has excluded himself from the community"89.
Also important for understanding Larenz's legal doctrine is 
his position vis-à-vis Hegel's legal philosophy, in particular 
that of the mature Hegel. Larenz, though brought up in a 
philosophical atmosphere impregnated with Hegelianism and though 
largely recognizing himself as Hegelian, departs from him where 
he conceives the law as "abstract law". This is for one 
fundamental reason: Hegelian "abstract law" involves a notion of 
legal subjectivity which is still the Enlightenment one. On this 
view the subject is such as a human or rational being, and 
subjectivity is thus a quality deriving from the intrinsic 
characteristics of man (the "humanity" or "rationality" of his
88 In this connection, cf. the remarks by A. Camus, 
Réflexions sur la guillotine. in A. Camus, A. Koestler, 
Réflexions sur la peine capitale. Calmann-Lévy, Paris 1986, p.125 
ff.




























































































being), and accordingly attributable to all human beings. This 
clearly contradicts the racism and anti-egalitarianism of the 
German jurist's theoretical approach.
Moreover, the idea of "abstract law" implies a notion of 
wrongfulness founded on the individual and not on the 
"community", hence a notion cf penalty which has to refer to the 
individual rather than to the community in order to acquire its 
own justification. "If the law," writes the German jurist, "is 
understood solely in a sense of 'abstract law', as recognition 
of the person and his 'sphere of freedom', then the wrongfulness 
(das Unrecht) will be the violation of that sphere of 
freedom"90. "If instead," Larenz goes on, "we see the law as the 
community order realized in its members' life together, then the 
wrongfulness will according to its meaning be negation of 
membership in the community or of the culprit's particular 
position as member"91. Thus wrongfulness consists essentially in 
this view in negation of the position as member, the 
Gliedstellung. and not of the individual's sphere of freedom as 
still in Hegel's philosophy. By negating his own "position as 
member" the subject also, according to Larenz, negates his own 
ethical nature. "By rebelling against the community and its laws 
he disowns his ethical destination as member of the community and 
undermines his own position in it"92. The penalty does no more, 
then, than bring out a fact already brought about by the 
criminal's act, his self-exclusion from the community. "The 
penalty makes this evident, representing a diminution not only 
of his legal goods but of his position as member, his honour, his 
freedom or his property"93. In this way the penalty no longer 
needs justificatory foundations, as instead happens where it is 
(a) a measure distinct from the wrongful act and not a mere 
"manifestation" of it, (b) a measure directed against the
90 K. Larenz, Die Aufaabe der Rechtsphilosophie. in 
"Zeitschrift fur Deutsche Kulturphilosophie", vol.4, 1938, p.233.
91 Ibidem.
92 Ibid. . pp.233-234.




























































































individual's "sphere of freedom" and not against his 
"existential" link with the "community". While in Hegel's theory 
of "abstract law" the penalty must always be justified in respect 
of the limitations and suffering it involves, as being a measure 
external to the subject originating in a limitation of his 
autonomy (the wrongful act) and being equally reduced to such a 
limitation, in Larenz's theory the penalty has no need for 
justification, as following cogently and almost automatically 
from the wrongful act and accordingly not needing justification 
vis-à-vis the individual, or because the wrongful act is a 
violation of the "community" and not of the individual's 
autonomy94.
In Larenz's National Socialist doctrine, legal subjectivity 
is uprooted from the subject's humanity, from his mere existence 
as a human being, and is founded instead on his social function 
and his loyalty to the political system (to the 
Volksgemeinschafti95. Thus, while in liberal systems' 
subjectivity is removed from normative intervention, or better 
from a normative intervention within the system which accepts the 
norm establishing the naturalistic basis of subjectivity (cf., 
e.g., Art.l of the Italian Civil Code), in Nazi law, where 
subjectivity is based on a dependent variable of the given 
normative system (the relation between subject and "national 
community") , that subjectivity may be attacked by measures within 
the system (without thereby modifying the given normative 
structure of the system). Moreover, since in this theory the 
subject's dignity and very existence are made to depend on his 
position as member of the Volksqemeinschaft. on his 
Gliedstellunq. the penalty, which as its principal target has 
just that "position as member", has as effect the moral and
94 Nor does the law as such, according to Larenz, need any 
"justification". For it "isn ot an apparatus "in itself" outside 
the values, which has to be justified or condemned from the 
viewpoint of the individual's morality, but is in itself a piece 
of the ethical life realized - and realizing itself - in the 
community" (K. Larenz, Das Problem der Rechtsqeltung■ p.31).
95 Cf. K. Larenz, Gemeinschaft und Rechtsstellunq. in 




























































































existential degradation of the culprit. "The laws of the Third 
Reich must lead to the annihilation of the criminal", writes Hans 
Frank96. The penalty is here theorized as a direct attack on the 
life and dignity of the person, an attack which may go to the 
extreme of suppressing that life and that dignity. The 
concentration and extermination camps are already adumbrated in 
this theory of penalty.
The penalty as stigma and as annihilation of the personality 
is a direct consequence of the view of the offender as alien to 
the community (and to the race, artfremd) and hence, by a 
mechanism of mental association it seemed to have been overcome 
by the progressive affirmation of the idea of "humanity", as an 
enemy97. In Nazi political doctrine, which has its most 
intelligent and refined formulation in the writings of Carl 
Schmitt, the enemy is just "the other", the foreigner. The enemy, 
writes Schmitt, "is just the other (der andere)■ the foreigner 
(der Fremde), and for him to subsist it is sufficient that he be 
existentially, in a particularly intense way, something other, 
something strange, so that in the extreme case conflicts are 
possible with him that cannot be decided either through a 
previously established general norming or through the verdict of 
a third "disinterested" and accordingly "impartial" party"98.
The crime is accordingly seen by National Socialist legal 
doctrine as a manifestation of hostility, an act of war, an 
activity of the "enemy". "In the National Socialist State," 
writes Erik Wolf, "the crime appears primarily as disobedience 
and rebellion; in the offender it is the enemy of the people that
96 H. Frank, Fondamento giuridico dello Stato 
nazionalsocialista. it. trans, p.33. Cf. K. Kraus, Die Dritte 
Walpurgjsnacht. ed. by H. Fischer, Kòsel, München 1967, p.264 ff.
97 In this connection see the observations by S. Freud, 
Zeitgemafies über Krieg und Tod. now also in S. Freud, 
Kulturtheoretische Schriften. ed. by A. Mitscherlich, A. Richards 
and J. Strachey, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1986, in particular 
p.136.
98 C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 





























































































is struck at"99. Once the crime is conceived of as an act of war 
against the community, an attack by the enemy, the attention of 
the criminal provision is increasingly directed more at the 
subject committing the crime than at the crime itself. Nazi 
criminal doctrine accordingly preached the move from a criminal 
law founded on the figure of the criminal act (Tatbestand1 to a 
law which instead metes out its blows and directs its attack no 
longer in relation to the fact termed criminal but in relation 
to the characteristics of the criminal subject, the offender100. 
In this view the offender is no longer the subject committing a 
criminal act; instead the act becomes criminal if and inasmuch 
as committed by a subject who is already in himself defined by 
his physical and mental characteristics as delinquent, that is, 
falls within the typology of the Verbrechenmensch101.
For National Socialist doctrine the delinquent is an 
"enemy", one who has rebelled against the order of the 
"community" and cut the umbilical cord binding him to it. He is 
often described as a "degenerate", "inferior" being. And since 
the enemy is to be annihilated, in accordance with the merciless 
friend/enemy dialectic which admits no middle terms, conciliation 
or moderation, theorized by Carl Schmitt and accepted by the bulk 
of Nazi legal theory, the death penalty is accepted by this
99 E. Wolf, Das Rechtsideal des nationalsozialistischen 
Staates ■ p.355, my emphasis. The theme of the offender as "enemy" 
turns up again in J. Binder, Grundleoung der Rechtsphilosophie■ 
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen 1935.
100 See G. Dahm, Verbrechen und Tatbestand■ in Grundfraaen 
der neuen Rechtswissenschaft. p.62 ff. See also K. Larenz, 
Rechtswidriakeit und Tatbestand in der Lehre vom Unrecht im 
Rechtsverkehr■ in "Deutsches Gemein- und Wirtschaftsrecht", 1 
October 1935-31 December 1936, p.401. On the centrality of the 
figure of the delinquent over the criminal act in Nazi penal 
doctrine, cf. M. Stolleis, Die Rechtsordnuna des NS-Staates. in 
"Juristische Schulung", 1982, p.651.
101 Cf. D. Dolling, Kriminoloqie im "Dritten Reich". in Recht 
und Justiz im "Dritten Reicht"■ ed. by R. Dreier and W. Sellert, 
p . 194 ff. On the figure of the "criminal man" in modern 
criminology influenced by positivist scientism and on its 
philosophical implications, see P. Strasser, Verbrechenmensch. 





























































































theory with sincere enthusiasm. "The death penalty," writes 
Larenz, "which definitively rids the community of the delinquent, 
accordingly at the same time, without prejudice to its own 
meaning, serves the purpose of counteraction 
fUnschadlichmachungj, suppression (Ausmerzuna  ̂of the degenerate 
I des Entarteten) and protection of the community from the spread 
of inferior subjects f der Minderwertiaen)1,102.
The concept of "enemy" is employed by National Socialist 
legal doctrine to justify the death penalty and at any rate the 
deviants exclusion from society. Nor could it, I believe, serve 
anything other than this102 03. The friend/enemy relation, as 
understood by Schmitt and other Nazi jurists like Wolf, Forsthoff 
and Koellreutter104, means nothing other than total war between
102 VWDS, p.40. "The suppression of the degenerate." Larenz 
continues, "fits fully in with the "healthy" view of the people 
fVolksanschauungj, not led astray by some false sense of 
humanitarianism. nor, however, dominated by a blind sense of 
revenge. It is as necessary for the safeguarding of the community 
as it is justified for the community's good and that of the 
offender who must answer for his actions" (ibid., my emphasis).
103 I regard some recent attempt to use Schmitt's concept of 
"enemy", loaded as it is with anti-egalitarian and totalitarian 
theoretical implications, in order to delineate a conflictualist 
and hence pluralist social model as doomed to failure. For this 
attempt see V. Tomeo, II diritto come struttura del conflitto. 
Angeli, Milano 1981, p.93 ff. For the anti-egalitarian 
implications of the concept of "enemy" in National-Socialist 
legal doctrine, cf. the use made of it, for instance, by H. 
Lange, Vom Gesetzesstaat zum Rechtsstaat. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), Tubingen 1934, p.20.
104 Schmitt's concept of "enemy" is, among other things, 
widely used to justify anti-Semitism. See what is written by 
Schmitt's pupil E. Forsthoff, Der totale Staat. pp.38-40; and O. 
Koellreutter, Vom Sinn und Wesen der nationalen Revolution. 
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen 1933, p.32. Moreover, in 
Schmitt's doctrine the "friend" is defined as "kin comrade" 
(Siooengenosse) and "blood friend" (Blutsfreund  ̂fcf. C. Schmitt, 
Uber das Verhaltnis der Begriffe Krieg und Feind (1938), 
Corollarium 2, in C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. 
p .104). For a further sample of the German public lawyer's anti- 
Semitism, see C. Schmitt, Die deutsche Rechtswisssenschaft in 
Kampf gegen den iudischen Geist. in "Deutsche Juristen- Zeitung", 
Issue 20, 41, of 15 October 1936, column 1193 ff. On the use of 
Schmitt's concept of "enemy" by National-Socialist legal doctrine 
and practice, one we11-documented study is by D. Majer, 




























































































two parties who are bearers of interests and values in conflict, 
and the rejection of any discursive rationality in their 
relationship105. And war cannot but tend to the victory of one of 
the two parties106, that is, the affirmation of the stronger and 
the defeat of the weaker. Accordingly, it tends towards the 
homogeneity of the social body, to the undisputed dominion of one 
alone (be it an individual or a group) , to the liguidation of the 
conflict. On the other hand, from the psychological viewpoint, 
as Stefan Zweig noted, "it is not possible to coordinate war with 
reason and with right feeling. It has need of a state of 
excitation of the feelings, of enthusiasm for one's own cause and 
hatred . of the adversary107. War (or the friend/enemy 
relationship) necessarily exalts fanaticism and not tolerance, 
aggressivity and not meekness, passion and not reason: all 
feelings suited to an authoritarian, integrated society, 
certainly not to a free, pluralist society. The notion of "enemy"
nationalsozialistischen Rechtssetzung und Rechtspraxis in 
Verwaltuna und Justiz unter besonderer Berücksichtiauna der 
eingegliederten Ostgebiete und des Generalaouvernements. Harald 
Boldt, Boppard am Rhein 1981, p.109 ff.
105 Had Schmitt not maintained - with disdain - that the 
basic principle of liberalism (by him identified with 
parliamentarianism tout court1 is discussion? Cf. C. Schmitt, Die 
geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus . Duncker 
& Humblot, Berlin 1961 (reprint of the second edition of 1926), 
p . 5 ff. On decisionism as the breaking off of discursive 
communications, cf. H. Lübbe, Dezisionismus - eine 
komoromittierte oolitische Theorie. now in H. Lübbe, Praxis der 
Philosophie. Praktische Philosophie. Geschichtstheorie■ Reclam, 
Stuttgart 1978, p.61 ff. On the relationship between "friend" and 
"enemy" as a breaking off of discussions, cf. also H. Heller, 
Gesammelte Schriften. ed. by M. Drath, G. Niemeyer, 0. Stammer, 
and F. Bolinski, Sijthoff, Leiden 1971, p.479.
106 In this connection, see the definition of war given by 
a "classic" of military theory, R. Montecuccoli, Aforismi 
dell'arte bellica, ed. by E. Faccioli, Fabbri, Milano 1973, p.7, 
and that of J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government■ Book 2, Chap. 
3 (ed. Everymans' Library, London-New York 1979, p.125).
107 S. Zweig, Die Welt von Gestern. Erinnerungen eines 
Europàers. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p.269. Cf. C. 
Schmitt, Uber das Verhaltnis der Begriffe Krieg und Feind. p.104, 
where for the definition of the concept of "enemy" reference is 




























































































is functional and serviceable to an anti-pluralist, organicist 
conception of society for which every deviant element, everyone 
different is in himself or herself, by mere existence, apart from 
any specific actions begun or accomplished, regarded as a danger, 
that is, as "enemy". And as such the enemy is to be rendered 
unable to do harm, that is - since it is the very existence of 
the enemy that constitutes a threat to the whole "community" - 
must be suppressed108.
108 enemy  in Schmitt's theory - as Hermann Heller notes - 
is the "outsider Ider Fremde ), who in the case of conflict must 
be annihilated" (H. Heller, Staatslehre■ ed. by J. Niemeyer, 6th 
revised edition, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen 1983, 
p.234, my emphasis). Indeed Schmitt's political theory is 
radically anti-pluralist: cf. C. Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der 
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